Earlier this year, cooperation between the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), the Maritime Surveillance Agency of the Ministry of Transport (KPLP) and the Indonesian Maritime Safety Agency (BAKAMLA) intensified. The latter is a maritime patrol and rescue agency reporting to the President of the Republic of Indonesia which has played a leading and superior role to the KPLP for several months in the security of the maritime spaces of the archipelago. Indeed, at the beginning of December 2022, the leaders of the CCG and BAKAMLA met for the first time during the “Vietnam Coast Guard and friends” meeting in Hanoi. The two sides reiterated their commitments to increase bilateral cooperation as part of the implementation of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Indonesia and China to strengthen maritime collaboration that had been put on hold amid the pandemic. In this sense, the Chinese Ambassador to Jakarta, Lu Kang, was received by Vice Admiral Aan Kurnia, Head of BAKAMLA on February 21, 2023, at the Agency's headquarters.

These exchanges between the two services are prompting numerous integrations while an ongoing dispute between China and Indonesia over Beijing's maritime activities on the border at the North of the Natuna Sea, the southernmost part of the South China Sea. In recent years, Indonesian maritime authorities have clashed with the CGC over China's territorial claims that overlap with Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), including off the oil reef "Tuna Block". Accordingly, as the year 2023 began, Indonesia sent several warships to the region to monitor the activities of Hanjing 5901, the CGC's Zhaotou-class patrol vessel and the world's largest coast guard vessel. The row continued to escalate as Indonesia decided to expand its offshore energy exploration by rejecting Beijing's nine-dash line. Jakarta has raised his voice as the archipelago is not among the six parties officially engaged in the South China Sea maritime dispute, which include Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan.

Indonesia is showing signs of concern as rising tensions in the northern Natuna Sea could make cooperation with the CCG more difficult or even come to an abrupt halt. Four ships, a maritime patrol aircraft and surveillance drones were deployed to protect Indonesia's EEZ on January 16. Jakarta recently reiterated its commitment to international maritime law and the application of the texts, more particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

However, the Chief of Naval Staff (KSAL), Admiral Muhammad Ali, declared on January 25 that the tensions observed in the Natuna region were not as serious as reported by the media. This statement seems to be an attempt to recover the facts to calm tensions with China and questions, while the two countries have recently congratulated themselves on the quality of the economic ties they maintain. Recall that Chinese President Xi Jinping launched, ten years ago, his ambitious project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This multifaceted program has enabled China to sustainably strengthen its economic and strategic alliance with Indonesia as the balance within one of the Indo-Pacific power arenas is increasingly difficult to pin down. Consequently, the rapprochement observed between the GCC and the BAKAMLA, initiated by Beijing, can be observed as a strong axis of cooperation while the Indonesian President, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, declared at the end of February that he wished take particular interest in the ongoing and long-standing negotiation of the South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC). In talks between China and the member countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) since 2002, Indonesia wishes to use its presidency of ASEAN in 2023 and the good relations maintained with China to bring a new productive momentum to negotiations. According to several Indonesian diplomats, this step could lead to greater collaboration and calm tensions in the South China Sea, while Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang declared during his visit to Jakarta at the end of February that “the ASEAN countries should not become proxies of any power and that it [Indonesia] should expedite the negotiation of the COC during its chairmanship of ASEAN”.

Faced with this duality in the speeches of the Indonesian government, it is worth remembering that the country has often invoked its historical position of neutrality on issues relating to tensions in the South China Sea. It is difficult to believe that the strategic place that Indonesia plays on the routes of world trade cannot make it yet another multiplier factor acting on the Sino-American rivalry. Consequently, Jakarta is trying to balance its cooperation with the two big giants and thus benefit from privileged ties with each, particularly in the fields of security and defence. In this sense, the current Indonesian Minister of Defense and candidate - for a third time - in the presidential election of 2024, Prabowo Subianto, met on November 18, 2022 his Chinese counterpart, General Wei Feng He on the occasion of a working visit to the city of Xi'an. At the end of this meeting, the two men announced the resumption of joint military exercises and training which had been temporarily interrupted since the Covid-19 pandemic. The cooperation between the BAKAMLA and the CCG seems to be part of an Indonesian wish to practice the doctrine of non-alignment, dear to the country since 1961, according to a “national interest”. This relatively vague approach to the question of the country's strategic positioning comes up against a deeper problem linked to the fact of seeing this rapprochement as an action carried out of simple "interest". The current government does not have the same orientations, the same missions and does not have the same diplomacy as at the beginning of the 1960s. This places, fortuitously it is true, Indonesia on a singular box of strategic chessboard inherent in the intellectual fundamentals that emerge from the “Indo-Pacific” approach to the region, so that the close cooperation in matters of maritime security which continues to develop between Jakarta and Washington cannot escape a confrontation behind the Indonesian conduct of a non-aligned foreign policy. This is how the various strategic alliances at the initiative of the United States are getting closer to Indonesia within the framework of maritime cooperation, like the “Quad”. Take, for example, the arrival of an Indian submarine, the INS Sindhukesari, which docked in Jakarta on February 23, while two Japanese navy warships made a stopover in Bitung, in North Sulawesi between February 27 and February 28. This was also verified during that same month as BAKAMLA conducted joint training directly with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) as part of a maritime security agreement signed between the two countries in 2018.

In view of the Indonesian position between China and the United States, the commitments envisaged by the CCG and the BAKAMLA on strengthening maritime cooperation raise sensitive questions. What will become of Indonesian marine scientific research, marine environmental protection, fishing and personnel training if one of the two powers of influence in the region defined by the "Indo-Pacific" concept does not support the effect of the other on Indonesian agencies? These questions remain unresolved for the time being. At present, it may be possible for Indonesia to work with both countries at a fundamental level, while building the trust necessary to deal with more sensitive and complex issues where cooperation would be difficult.

It is certain that the coastguard collaboration will not resolve the long-standing tensions between Indonesia and China at the North of the Natuna Sea. At the same time, we have seen the emergence of a more nuanced discourse from Indonesia on its relationship with China in recent years as Beijing faces tougher competition than ever in Southeast Asia, which undermines the BRI. This territorial dispute underlines the Indonesian side's lack of trust in Beijing as the two countries increase high-level meetings and dialogue and cooperation formats. Jakarta seems to want to maintain peace and security in the South China Sea and thus avoid any possible escalation with Beijing; catastrophic situation that would position the Indonesian armed forces in a strong logistical impasse in the event of a conflict.